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The U.S. economy has performed well over the last several years com-
pared to what we have come to expect in recent decades. But, it is far
f rom the best it can be. The unemployment rate of 4.2 percent is the
lowest we have seen since the 1960s, but in the midst of the longest
peacetime expansion in the nation’s history it is nearly double rates
common in the 1950s. In addition to the unemployed, there are millions
who are underemployed and millions more who are officially out of the
labor force but would work if a job were available. Of those who have
full-time jobs, many earn wages below the poverty line.
In good economic times people forget about business cycles, but the
expansion will eventually turn to recession. Povert y, joblessness, and
underemployment will again increase. Although no one can say exactly
when the next recession will begin, troubling signs have appeare d
around the world: equity and bond market volatility, financial crises, and
obsession with budget deficit reduction. If the U.S. labor market is fail-
ing so many people at the peak of the business cycle, how will we meet
the challenges of the next recession?
In this brief, I discuss three strategies that have recently been proposed
to increase employment and spread economic gains to the least advan-
taged: reduction of the workweek, employment subsidies, and the public
s e rvice employment program. The public service employment pro g r a m
seems preferable to the others largely because of its ability to ensure truly
full employment without creating inflationary pre s s u res. Where re d u c-
tion of the workweek has been tried as an employment strategy, it failed
to generate more employment and had adverse consequences for output,
inflation, and balance of trade. Subsidized low-wage employment
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schemes have a high cost and may not generate more employment. If
they do promote employment, they may create upward pressure on prices
and may lead to rigidities in the labor market that hinder expansion.
In contrast, a public service employment program would ensure full
employment by offering a job at a fixed wage to anyone willing and able
to work. The program would not be inflationary. Spending would rise no
further than the point at which all excess labor was employed; the fixed
wage would prevent accelerating pressure on costs. The program would
preserve labor market flexibility. If the private sector’s demand for labor
increased, it could hire workers away from the program; if demand fell,
workers could re t u rn to the program. Also, public service employment
would prevent the erosion of human capital that comes from joblessness
and would provide valuable services for the society.
I hope you find this re s e a rch of interest and I look forw a rd to hearing
your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
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Unemployment cannot be conquered by a democracy until it is
understood. Full productive employment in a free society is pos-
sible but it is not possible without taking pains. It cannot be
won by waving a financial wand; it is a goal that can be reached
only by conscious continuous organization of all our productive
re s o u rces under democratic control. To win full employment
and keep it, we must will the end and must understand and will
the means.
—William Beveridge, 1945       
Writing in the 1940s, Beveridge defined full employment as a labor mar-
ket in which the number of job vacancies is higher than the number of
jobless (Beveridge 1945), a condition that guarantees no long-term
unemployment. What Beveridge envisaged was achieved in the immedi-
ate postwar years, but it was not sustained. However, the U.S. economy
now appears to have reached what many believe is “full-employment”
with low and stable inflation. 
In March 1999 the unemployment rate was announced at 4.2 percent,
but unemployment rates as conventionally measured cannot tell the
entire story. The job landscape does not seem so rosy when one considers
the number of people who are no longer counted as part of the labor
force and the number of “employed” who are involuntarily working part-
time. The Bureau of Labor Statistics regularly reports large flows in and
out of the official categories “unemployed,” “employed,” and “out of the
labor force.” In March 1999, for example, of the unemployed, 47.2 per-
cent were job losers, 12.9 percent were job leavers, and 40.0 percent had
previously been out of the labor force. People who found jobs typically
Full Employment Has Not
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were new entrants to the labor force or came from the out of the labor
force category.
Of the 68 million people in the out of the labor force category, 4.47
million wanted a job, 1.2 million had a marginal attachment to the
labor force and were not currently working, and the rest had no attach-
ment to the labor force. In addition, Lester Thurow (1996) notes that
t h e re are a few million missing males who used to be in the workforc e ,
a re not in school, are not old enough to have re t i red, are neither
employed nor unemployed, and are not out of the labor force. They
either have dropped out of or have been dropped from the GDP
machine of the United States. There are also almost 3.7 million people
who are involuntarily working part-time but for statistical purposes are
included in the employed category and are not diff e rentiated fro m
those working full-time. Although it is not possible to calculate how
many more individuals would work if jobs were made available, these
numbers demonstrate that there are undoubtedly millions of these
potential workers. 
F i n a l l y, to make matters worse, the unemployment rate is undere s t i-
mated if one applies the concept of “disguised” unemployment, defined
as employment in sectors with low productivity as compared with pro-
ductivity in manufacturing (Robinson 1937). By and large, employment
growth has been not in manufacturing but in services, whose productiv-
ity lags behind that in manufacturing (Eatwell 1995).
This state of affairs coincides with a rush to embrace deficit reduction in
countries throughout the world. Part of the rush to deficit reduction in
the United States is a dismantling of the social safety net that has tradi-
tionally protected the most vulnerable segments of the population from
economic and other hardship. Welfare reform forces recipients off public
assistance and leaves it to individual states to find jobs for them, a task
the states are unable—even if they are willing—to do. Cutting off aid
will not necessarily put people to work. For example, a recent survey in
New York State showed that two-thirds of the individuals leaving the
rolls of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and
Home Relief programs failed to get jobs (The New York Times, March 23,
1998, 1). These individuals were left without the means to provide forFull Employment Has Not Been Achieved
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themselves and their families; the re f o rm forced them deeper into
poverty rather than toward self-sufficiency.
In Europe central banks continue a policy of tight money even while
many countries—within and outside the European Union (EU)—expe-
rience double-digit official unemployment rates. Belgium, France,
Germany, and Italy have all had unemployment rates around 10 percent,
Spain has averaged closer to 20 percent for over two years, and all are
p rojecting similar rates through the year 2002. At the same time EU
member states are preparing to give up their sovereignty to conduct
coordinated fiscal and monetary policy by accepting the rules of a flawed
European Monetary Union (EMU). The Maastricht Treaty sets ceilings
for inflation and government deficits and debt, but not for unemploy-
ment, which, as of the end of February 1999, stood at approximately 16.8
million for the 15 member-states. When asked about remedies to amelio-
rate high unemployment rates, EU economics ministers respond that
they are making progress identified as a “change in trend but not yet of a
breakthrough” (Financial Times, March 12, 1998).
During the Great Depression in the United States the govern m e n t
addressed unemployment through direct intervention in the labor mar-
ket. The government-instituted programs to create jobs were temporary,
however, and they were discontinued with the economic recovery that
accompanied U.S. entry into World War II. The depression-era and
immediate postwar commitment to a “guarantee of employment” was
replaced with efforts to “promote maximum employment.” In the 1950s
and 1960s promotion of full or maximum employment meant macro -
economic policies designed to manage aggregate demand, supplemented
by selective programs such as job training and limited income mainte-
nance. With the onset of the stagflation of the 1970s, however, even the
m oderate approach of demand management faltered, and a consensus
developed among economists and policymakers worldwide that an
unemployment rate of 5 percent in the United States (and as high as 10
percent in France) would be too inflationary. 
The idea of a “natural rate of unemployment,” below which unemploy-
ment cannot fall without creating inflation, continues to this day. This
conventional wisdom requires that to ensure price stability, millions of 
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individuals who are re a d y, willing, and able to work must remain idle,
t h e reby serving as a “re s e rve pool” or “forgotten army” of labor. Tw o
important questions, then, may be posed regarding unemployment. First,
is the current labor market situation the best we can do in times of pros-
perity? Second, are we pre p a red to meet the challenges of the next
d o w n t u rn? (Wo rrisome signs have already appeared: equity and bond
market volatility in the United States and overseas, the Asian and
Russian crises, unprecedented rates of household and business indebted-
ness in the United States, and an obsession with meeting govern m e n t
budget deficit reduction targets everywhere.)
The challenge for policymakers is to craft employment policies that
uphold the basic human right to a job and are not inflationary, do not
i n t e rf e re with decisions of individual firms, do not rely on the failed
approach of fine-tuning aggregate demand, and are consistent with the
fundamental premise that, to the extent possible, socially prod u c t i v e
work is preferable to income maintenance. Such requirements have been
recognized by a number of academics and policymakers across the theo-
retical and political spectrum, and many measures to achieve higher
employment have been suggested. This brief examines three measure s
that have received considerable attention—reduction of the workweek,
employment subsidies, and public service employment—to determ i n e
which best meets the requirements.
Reduction of the Wo rk we e k
Reducing the workweek and other arrangements for sharing available
work have been introduced many times by governments and trade
unions alike as mechanisms to ameliorate high unemployment and to
provide flexibility and power sharing in the workplace. Work sharing is
not limited to reducing the normal workweek; it also includes arrange-
ments such as job sharing, job splitting, elimination of overtime, phased
e n t ry into the labor market through extended education and training,
phased re t i rement and in general part-time work. Part-time work 
was promoted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) as a measure to increase flexibility that “could
enhance job creation and employment prospects” (1995, 23).Full Employment Has Not Been Achieved
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The principal argument made in favor of work-sharing arrangements is
that they “redistribute work over people so as to reduce the extent of
involuntary unemployment” (Drèze 1986, 1). As the Commission of the
European Community put it, “The aim of work-sharing is to redistribute
the total volume of work in the economy in order to increase employ-
ment opportunities for all those wishing to work. This does not mean
that the volume of work remains constant. Rather it is based on the
observation that this volume is at present inadequate and that we must
t ry to redistribute it” (1978, 2). The European Union continued the
endorsement of this employment strategy by incorporating it into the
1993 directive it issued on work time.
As Euro p e ’s unemployment rates have remained at re c o rd levels, the
trading of hours for jobs has remained an employment policy looked on
favorably by employers and trade unions. In Germany reductions in the
n o rmal workweek were implemented in the 1950s and 1960s. In the
early 1990s Germ a n y ’s economics minister, Gunter Rexrodt, suggested
that saving jobs would re q u i re shorter hours and longer holidays.
Volkswagen warned that it would have to make massive layoffs if a four-
day workweek with a 20 percent wage cut was not accepted (Gow 1993;
“Sharing the Burden” 1993). In 1982 the Netherlands experimented
with a reduced workweek and forf e i t u re of pay increases after having
experienced high unemployment and an increase in the labor forc e
throughout the 1970s.
The French experience is perhaps the most interesting because until the
1980s there had been a widespread belief across the political spectrum in
France that shortening the workweek would lead to employment cre-
ation (“France: Company Work-Sharing Agreements” 1993). In Jallade’s
(1991) analysis of French working time policies, he argued that, contrary
to public sentiment, no significant employment effects were discernible
from the 1980s reductions in the workweek, and if there were any, they
were most likely offset by the decline in French competitiveness result-
ing from increased wage costs. Furt h e rm o re, he suggested that the
spreading of work by reducing work hours might lead not to additional
jobs but to a faster pace for workers and higher prod u c t i v i t y. Prime
Minister Jospin’s attempt in 1996 to reduce the workweek to 35 hours as
a macroeconomic policy for job creation met strong opposition fro mFull Employment Policy: Theory and Practice
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economists and trade unions alike. The government went ahead and
instituted the 35-hour workweek, the objections and criticisms notwith-
standing. Early reports indicate not only insignificant reductions in the
unemployed but also projections of higher unit costs.
Studies to quantify the Dutch experiment’s impact on employment
g rowth showed no significant changes, indicating that reducing the
workweek was “a relatively ineffective policy for reducing unemploy-
ment” (Roche, Fynes, and Morrissey 1996, 136). Although the re d u c-
tions in Germany in the 1950s and 1960s did establish a new norm a l
workweek, they had no apparent impact on employment (Hinrichs
1991). Empirical evidence on the effects of reduced working hours
schemes in Belgium in the 1980s and in Australia in the 1970s and
1980s—when unemployment rose—also indicates no growth in employ-
ment (Roche, Fynes, and Morrissey 1996). To the contrary, in Australia
because the standard workweek was reduced, employers had to get their
employees to work overtime to make up for the reduction in hours. This
extra cost reduced economic activity and resulted in a decrease in
employment (Dixon 1987). This kind of employment policy resembles
the “shock therapy” applied to Russia and the former Warsaw Pact
economies during transition, the abysmal results of which have been
well documented (Papadimitriou 1991). 
In the United States reduction of working hours has not been used as a
strategy to increase employment. In The Overworked American, Juliet
Schor (1991) reported that Americans worked 1,924 hours in 1989 com-
pared with 1,786 hours two decades earlier, an increase of 7.7 percent.
She suggested that reducing the workweek would lead to less absen-
teeism, less turn o v e r, less personal business on company time, lower
costs, and, perhaps, increased employment. As unemployment rose in
the 1970s and 1980s, some labor economists and others advocated
reducing the standard workweek to “spread the work,” arguing that it
would put millions of individuals to work (Levitan and Belous 1977;
Morand and Macoy 1984; McGaughey 1981). What happened instead
was that many employers and employees (who consented because of an
e n v i ronment of job insecurity) have increased the workweek thro u g h
overtime as a means to decrease employer costs (they do not pay benefits
on overtime work) and to increase income for employees.Full Employment Has Not Been Achieved
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The magnitude of the increase in work hours has led many researchers to
question the ability of official statistics on unemployment to describe
real labor market conditions. Figure 1 shows the trend in average weekly
hours worked for prime-age workers since 1975 (Bluestone and Rose
1998, 34). During the last two recoveries—1982 to 1989 and 1992 to
1995—average weekly hours increased significantly without a pro-
nounced change in the number of prime-age workers, which indicates,
in effect, the existence of an unmeasured labor force and provides rea-
sons for the coexistence of low unemployment and low inflation that we
have experienced in the 1980s and 1990s. In simple arithmetic term s ,
given that the employed labor force was about 100 million in 1982, the
increase in hours is approximately equivalent to adding 3.7 million new
workers to the labor force or decreasing the official unemployment rate
by 3.7 percentage points (Bluestone and Rose 1998, 35). With so many
employers and employees willing to increase work hours, it is unlikely
that an effort to reduce the standard workweek could be successful in the
United States.
Figure 1 Average Weekly Hours Worked, All Prime-Age Workers 
(Age 25–54)
Note: Dashed lines indicate recovery periods.
S o u rc e : F rom Barry Bluestone and Stephen Rose, The Unmeasured Labor Forc e, Public
Policy Brief no. 39 (Annandale-on-Hudson, N.Y.: The Jerome Levy Economics Institute,
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The Japanese experience with shorter working hours has been scanty.
Until recently Japan’s official unemployment rates were low, thus negat-
ing any interest in full employment policy. As Deutschmann (1991) said,
the employment practices of Japanese firms involve more normal work
hours, more overtime, and fewer paid holidays than the practices of
other industrial countries. The likely employment effects of fewer work-
ing hours were simulated with a simple model by Brunello (1989). The
econometric results of the model indicated that a reduction of the work-
week would be associated with an increase in overtime and a reduction
in employment.
Reducing work hours to generate employment, in the European experi-
ence, not only failed to enlarge the pool of employed workers but also
resulted in such negative side effects as loss of output, inflation, and
imbalance of trade. Moreover, working time reductions instituted during
periods of persistently high unemployment may become permanent and
thus increase the already significant number of individuals who are
c h ronically under- or unemployed (Owen 1989, 141). All individuals
who are able and willing to work cannot be employed by spreading the
work of those who are employed. To deal adequately with stru c t u r a l
unemployment re q u i res not rationing work, but making more work.
What is needed is the development of policies to increase the demand
for labor. To these options, we turn next.
E mp l oyment Subsidies
Subsidies for re w a rding work already exist in the form of the earn e d
income tax credit (EITC). Evidence for the effectiveness of the EITC is
mixed, and it has been criticized for many reasons: it is vulnerable to
abuse since it does not take into account nonwage income; it is directed
mainly to heads of households and neglects many poor, single workers; it
i n t e rvenes in labor markets by depressing wages; it provides the least
incentive to work to those whose job commitment is the weakest, since
the potential benefits for them are low (Phelps 1997).
The negative income tax has long been proposed as an employment
solution. Because it benefits every individual regardless of employment,
it works more to alleviate the problem of inequitable distribution ofFull Employment Has Not Been Achieved
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income than to maximize employment (Tobin 1966; Tobin et al. 1967).
In addition, income maintenance programs, such as the negative income
tax, increase aggregate demand without increasing aggregate supply,
putting more pre s s u re on prices than an employment program that
increases both aggregate supply and aggregate demand. There is, by and
large, general agreement that neither the EITC nor the negative income
tax provides an inducement for employment growth among the unem-
ployed, the nonemployed, and those on welfare or an incentive for
poorly paid workers to hold onto a job to the same extent that a wage
subsidy would.1
In a series of articles culminating in a highly acclaimed book, Edmund
Phelps, of Columbia University, has presented a more extensive plan for
subsidizing the employment of low-wage, lower-skilled workers (1994a,
1994b, 1997). He contends that employment subsidies can act as an
impetus for higher levels of employment from the ranks of the unem-
ployed and those not presently in the labor force.
Employment subsidy schemes that partially offset the cost to firms of
employing additional workers by public payments to the firms gained
considerable currency in the 1930s as a means to counter economic
contraction and high unemployment and to lift or “re w a rd” low-wage
w o r k e r s .2 H o w e v e r, as Phelps points out, in the 1950s and 1960s, when
the Keynesian notion of demand management through monetary and
fiscal policies dominated thought about unemployment policy, “wage
subsidies fell out of fashion, if not into disrepute. Then, in the 1970s,
when economists concluded that the usual monetary maladjustment
works itself out—that unemployment tends toward its current ‘natural’
level through wage adjustments or the traditional behavior of the cen-
tral bank—the way was clear for a re t u rn of the idea of employment
subsidies” (Phelps 1997, 144). 
Phelps makes the case that wage subsidies to employers can have an
impact not only on the workers who directly benefit from them, but also
on the wider community. Subsidies could translate into higher wages,
which are an incentive for disadvantaged workers to enter the labor
force. These individuals may otherwise be susceptible to engaging in ille-
gal activities or relying on the benefits and entitlements afforded by the
safety net (Phelps 1994b, 57).Full Employment Policy: Theory and Practice
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Phelps estimates that the initial cost of his proposed graduated employ-
ment subsidy (the subsidy decreases as the wage increases) would have
been about $98 billion if it had been put in place in 1990, as indicated in
Table 1. The estimate goes up to $125 billion in 1997, reflecting infla-
tionary increases in money wages and the increase in employment over
the 1990 to 1997 period (Phelps 1997, 116). Phelps is not concern e d
about the cost of his proposal, however, since he calculates that a small
increase in the payroll tax (2.5 percent) can finance it.
Even though Phelps refers to his scheme as a “market-based approach,”
the plan entails significant interference with employer decisions, thereby
d i s t o rting the market mechanism. There is a question as to whether a 
Table 1  Cost of the Model Wage Subsidy Plan
Number of
Hourly Hourly Annual Annual Employees      Subsidy Outlay
Wage Subsidy Wage Subsidy (%)   (millions)  ($billions)
$1 or less $0.00 — — 1.0 0.061 —
2 to 1.01 0.00 — — 0.2  0.122 —
3 to 2.01 0.00 — — 0.8 0.488 —
4 to 3.01 3.00 $7,000 $6,000 5.9 3.599 $21.594
5 to 4.01 2.29 9,000 4,580 10.4 6.344 29.056 
6 to 5.01 1.65 11,000  3,300 9.4 5.734           18.922
7 to 6.01 1.12 13,000 2,240 9.6 5.856           13.117    
8 to 7.01 0.71 15,000 1,420 9.1 5.551 7.882
9 to 8.01 0.43 17,000 860 7.0 4.270 3.672
10 to 9.01 0.24 19,000 480 8.1 4.941 2.372
11 to 10.01 0.13 21,000 260 4.2 2.562 0.666
12 to 11.01 0.06 23,000 120 5.3 3.233 0.388
13 to 12.01 0.00 25,000 0 4.6 2.806 0
14 to 13.01 0.00 27,000 0 3.4 2.074 0
15 to 14.01 0.00 29,000 0 3.7 2.257 0
20 to 15.01 0.00 35,000 0 10.4 6.344 0
25 to 20.01 0.00 45,000 0 4.3 2.623 0
More than 25 0.00 — 0 3.5 2.135 0
Total 100.0 61.000 $97.669
Notes: Percentage distribution from the Current Population Survey, March 1990. Number
of employees from the U.S. Census 1990. Table covers full-time employees in the private
sector (full-time employees taken to work 2,000 hours per year). 
Source: From Rewarding Work by Edmund S. Phelps. Copyright © 1997 by the President
and Fellows of Harvard College. Reprinted by permission of Harvard University Press.
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firm’s behavior will become directed toward obtaining the subsidy, rather 
than to the market to obtain profits. Phelps argues this criticism away by
distinguishing “private” from “social” productivity and thus “fre e -
market” from “social” prices of labor, which gives rise to distinguishing
private from social costs. Economists have recognized since at least the
early 1900s that even in competitive markets there are many instances
in which a “free-market” price diverges from the “right” price (Pigou
1933). Phelps insists his plan is based on the view that “judicious subsi-
dies are acceptable . . . as long as the system of free enterprise is kept
f i rmly in place” and “if low-wage workers become better re w a rded, a
m o re adventurous and less bridled capitalism might well be justified”
(1997, 123).
It is by no means certain that Phelps’s plan will actually achieve the
higher levels of employment he assumes it will. For one thing, it is possi-
ble that employers will seek to substitute subsidized workers for those
c u rrently employed. If the plan is successful in promoting higher levels of
private sector employment, it may have two serious side effects. First, it is
likely to add to rigidities in the economic system that hinder expansion.
As it tightens the labor market, it makes it more difficult for expanding
f i rms to find workers. Second, it is likely to cause inflation. Even though
f i rms will pay only a portion of the wages of the expanded workforc e ,
m o re money will enter the economy through the subsidies, driving up
the demand for goods and there f o re putting upward pre s s u re on prices. In
the end, what can be said is that subsidized low-wage labor schemes
come with a high price tag and may not guarantee full employment. 
Public Service Emp l oy m e n t
Hyman P. Minsky (1986) believed employment policies based on subsi-
dies were liable to lead to inflation, serious financial instability, and
financial crisis. He proposed an alternative employment strategy in
which government acts as the “employer of last resort.” He felt this strat-
egy could promote full employment without the inflationary pre s s u re s
and structural rigidities usually associated with full employment. A group
of re s e a rchers at the Levy Institute (Wray 1997; Forstater 1997;
Papadimitriou 1998) have developed Minsky’s proposals in considerableFull Employment Policy: Theory and Practice
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detail, providing even greater theoretical support for a government job
assurance strategy.
The proposal—here called the public service employment program—has
two basic components: an employment program that offers workers an
opportunity for employment and an exogenously set program wage that
protects against inflationary pressures. The first component of the pro-
posal is relatively simple. The government would announce the wage at
which it will offer employment to all who want to work and then would
employ them at that wage in the public sector. If the government sets
the wage at $6.00 per hour, a worker can make $12,500 working full-
time, full-year (2,080 hours). Normal public sector employment would
not be affected by the plan; it would remain a vital and separate compo-
nent of public employment. The government would become, in a sense,
“a market maker for labor” by establishing a “buffer stock of labor.” It
would stand ready to “buy” all unemployed labor at a fixed price (wage)
or to “sell” it, that is, allow the program labor force to be reduced when
the private sector needs labor and offers workers a higher price (wage).
As in all buffer stock schemes, the commodity used as the buffer stock is
always fully employed but also available, which means that the pro g r a m
e n s u res a “loose” labor market even as it ensures full employment. A buff e r
stock commodity also always has a stable price, which in this case cannot
deviate much from the range established by the govern m e n t ’s announced
wage, so the program ensures stable prices with full employment.
The public service employment program stands in stark contrast to
Keynesian demand management policies. The Keynesian policies are
designed to “prime the pump” with government spending to incre a s e
private demand sufficiently to lower unemployment to a level that
would not be inflationary. The problem is that such policies may lead to
labor markets tight enough to generate inflation long before “full”
employment is reached. A public service employment strategy would
operate through increases or decreases in a buffer stock of labor that was
employed, rather than maintaining a re s e rve army of the unemployed.
(If the buffer stock shrinks so much during an expansion that inflation-
a ry pre s s u res result, government can raise taxes or reduce spending to
replenish the buffer stock.)Full Employment Has Not Been Achieved
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The public service employment program can eliminate all involuntary
unemployment by providing jobs for every person re a d y, willing, and
able to work. There will still be many individuals—even among those in
the labor force—who will be voluntarily unemployed for a variety of rea-
sons; for example, some may be unwilling to work for the government,
others may be unwilling to work for the govern m e n t ’s pre d e t e rm i n e d
wage, and still others would prefer to search for a better job. Some indi-
viduals will remain unemployed because they cannot meet the minimum
standards for public employment. But any person able to work—defined
b roadly as anyone who can make a contribution to the economy and
society, irrespective of the size and type of that contribution—will have
the opportunity to do so.
A program of such scope means that much social spending for the unem-
ployed can be reduced or eliminated altogether. For example, public ser-
vice employment will render unemployment compensation unnecessary
since all willing and able workers would be employed. No one who is
able would be paid for not working, and pay would be equalized among
those who cannot find jobs in the private sector. Other forms of social
spending, such as Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and food stamps, could
be substantially reduced. Because many individuals currently re c e i v i n g
such assistance are not and probably could not be in the labor force, a
public service employment program cannot replace all social support .
Precisely who would be forced out of the support programs and into pub-
lic service employment cannot be easily determined. What can be seen
is that for the former support recipients the program has major advan-
tages over the current welfare-to-work schemes: It is voluntary, ensures
that a job is available, and has no lifetime limit. 
Taking the current number of unemployed, the savings from various pro-
grams that would be eliminated or reduced, and the projected cost of the
public service employment program, Wray (1997) has estimated the net
cost to the government at about $50 billion. Since this sum is quite
small relative to the size of the federal budget, GDP, and this year’s fed-
eral budget surplus (and those projected into the future), the budgetary
effects of the program would be small. Moreover this estimate does not
take into account any indirect benefits likely to redound from the policyFull Employment Policy: Theory and Practice
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from decreases in the social and economic costs of unemployment (such
as crime, physical and mental ill health, deterioration of skills) and from
the promotion of beneficial public sector projects (such as environmen-
tal cleanup, urban reconstruction, educational services).
Questions are likely to be raised about the impact of a public serv i c e
employment program on inflation. Will full employment increase aggre-
gate demand to a level that results in accelerating demand-pull inflation?
Alternatively, can aggregate demand increase sufficiently with the addi-
tional federal spending and still not generate inflation? The answers
seem clear. Public and private sector spending now (in the absence of a
public service employment policy) provides a level of employment that
leaves more than 6 million workers unemployed and more than 3 mil-
lion underemployed; people are not spending enough to create a suff i-
cient number of jobs. The existence of involuntarily unemployed
workers is de facto evidence that aggregate demand is below the level
required for full employment. As long as additional government spend-
ing does raise employment, this indicates that aggregate demand is still
below the full employment level.
The very design of the public service employment program ensures that
additional federal spending will rise only to the point at which all invol-
untary employment is eliminated. Once there are no workers willing to
accept a program job, spending will not increase. Spending will not
become “excessive,” that is, it will not cause aggregate demand to
i n c rease beyond the full employment level. Fine-tuning aggre g a t e
demand, through changes in taxation and expenditure, is still possible
with the adoption of this policy; increases in demand will shrink the
buffer stock of labor, and decreases will replenish it. Since the program
limits spending to the level that will guarantee true full employment,
concerns about demand-pull inflation are alleviated.
What about cost-push inflation resulting from the pressure on wages and
in turn on costs and prices? Here is where the second component of 
the proposal comes into play. The wage paid by the government in the 
public service employment program is exogenously set. Being a fixed
price, it is stable and sets a benchmark price for labor. Although some
private sector jobs and regular public service jobs might still pay a wage
below the program wage, once the program is put in place, most of theFull Employment Has Not Been Achieved
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low-wage jobs will experience a one-time wage increase or may disappear
altogether.3 Wages for those who make less than $12,500 might experi-
ence a one-time incre a s e .4 And workers of higher prod u c t i v i t y, who
already make more than $6.00 per hour, might become more obstinate in 
their wage demands, so that other wages also ratchet upward. Employers
will be forced to cover these higher costs through a combination of
higher product prices, greater labor productivity, and lower realized prof-
its. Thus, some product prices will experience a one-time increase, but a
one-time jump is not inflation and it cannot be accelerating inflation (as
these terms are normally defined by economists).
The pre s s u re on costs would also be limited by reducing erosion of
human capital. Recent literature finds that idle human capital depreci-
ates rapidly and thus entails a high cost. Labor productivity falls quickly
when labor is unemployed, and beyond some point workers may become
unemployable (for example, because of loss of “work habit”). Because
with a public service employment policy people who are not employed
in the private sector or regular public sector continue to work, their
skills do not depreciate so quickly, if at all. Indeed, the program could be
g e a red toward enhancing the human capital of its pool of labor. This
enhancement would reduce the productivity-adjusted cost of hiring
workers from the pool relative to hiring unemployed workers and
thereby diminish inflationary pressures.
Against any tendency for wages to ratchet upward must be measured the
l i k e l i h o od that the public service employment program will maintain
and possibly enhance the human capital of workers who are temporarily
unneeded in the private sector. When demand for private output rises
sufficiently for these workers to be hired in the private sector, the some-
what higher cost of workers in the program relative to the cost of unem-
ployed workers in the absence of the program is partially offset by higher
productivity, thereby reducing any pressure on prices. Moreover, because
unemployment compensation may no longer be needed, there would be
no need for experience-rated unemployment insurance taxes on firm s
and workers. The elimination of these taxes would reduce overall labor
costs for firms that typically have volatile (seasonal or cyclical) demand 
for labor, which, again, would tend to offset some of the higher wage
costs. By and large, even the one-time upward adjustment in wages and
prices might be quite small.Full Employment Policy: Theory and Practice
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Other questions about a program of public service employment (reflect-
ing a variety of political points of view) have been raised. We can
respond to some of them briefly.
• Will the program be another make-work New Deal WPA? One way to
respond to this question is to cite the many artistic and educational
accomplishments and improvements to the nation’s physical infra-
structure that were the achievements of the WPA. More importantly,
the WPA gave to millions of people the opportunity to contribute
productively to the American economy and society (Minsky 1986).
Another way to respond is to list the many necessary and beneficial
jobs program workers could fill—teachers’ aids; library and day care
assistants; companions to senior citizens, the bedridden, and the
mentally and physically impaired; environmental safety monitors;
and many more. The program can provide valuable public services.
• Can such a program be efficiently administere d ? Given the abuses of
some public programs, concerns about administering the program are
legitimate. However, there have also been some model pro g r a m s ,
such as VISTA, the Peace Corps, and Americorps.
• Since states are already implementing welfare-to-work programs, why is
this program needed? With only a few exceptions, states have indi-
cated that they will not offer permanent work to former welfare
recipients. They will be left to fend for themselves.
• Will a stigma be attached to participation in such a pro g r a m ? P e a c e
Corps, VISTA, and Americorps participants have been well regarded.
A public service work assignment may prove to be a good entry 
on a resume.
• Why worry now, when unemployment is at its lowest level in a genera -
tion? A closer look at the official unemployment statistics shows that
the country is not a “worker heaven.” The large population of invol-
untarily unemployed and underemployed warrants concern in a
country that considers socially productive work a virtue and upholds
the right of its citizens to employment.
What Is to Be Done?
It is difficult to see how truly full employment under a public service job
opportunity program could be more inflationary than our current system
a21of maintaining a reserve army of the unemployed and public assistance, a
system that pays people for not working, allows their human capital to
depreciate, and results in the high economic and social costs associated
with unemployment. Wage subsidies and reductions in the workweek,
even if they turn out to be successful at increasing employment substan-
t i a l l y, could result in the inflation and sluggish growth associated with
tight labor markets and structural rigidities. In contrast, a public service
employment solution provides full employment with price stability and
labor market flexibility. As Minsky put it, “only an infinitely elastic
demand for labor can guarantee full employment without setting off a
wage-price spiral, and only government can create an infinitely elastic
demand for labor” (1986). At the same time, as long as those holding a
program job are available when private sector demand increases, such a
p rogram will not result in inflationary pre s s u res or structural rigidities.
The public service employment approach also will be relatively inexpen-
sive and likely to pay for itself. It can preserve human capital and pro-
vide valuable public services.
The costs of unemployment are significant and many of them can be
quantified, especially those associated with the loss of output that unem-
ployed workers could have produced. Furt h e rm o re, the employed (and
their employers) are burdened with financing the unemployment insur-
ance and other maintenance support the unemployed receive. Alas, the
“damages” of unemployment do not stop there. Negative effects that
afflict the unemployed include loss of freedom and social exclusion, poor
health, discouragement and loss of motivation for future work, weaken-
ing of family stru c t u re, cynicism and ultimate loss of social values and
s e l f - reliance, and psychological suffering even to the point of suicide
(Sen 1997). Unemployment also breeds racial and gender intolerance. 
It engenders resistance to organizational flexibility and promotes techni-
cal conservatism in those currently employed who fear downsizing
and joblessness.
The realized costs and negative effects of unemployment are undoubt-
edly much higher in Europe than in the United States. Yet, the absence
in the Maastricht Treaty of specific resolutions regarding unemployment,
while it includes specific resolutions to reduce inflation and budget
deficits, is disturbing. In the United States the government has gradually
re t reated from Franklin Roosevelt’s assertion of every o n e ’s “right to 
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employment” and the initial push to “guarantee full employment.” The
Employment Act of 1946 reduced the commitment to the “promotion”
of “maximum employment,” and since the 1970s the commitment has
been reduced still further to the acceptance of a rather large “natural rate
of unemployment.” But the real issue is not to discover each continent’s
or country’s skeletons in the closet, but to work toward making policy-
makers willing to learn from the successful (and failed) policies of the
past, amend them to reflect current economic conditions, and, finally,
marshal the needed resources to implement them.
In William Vi c k re y ’s American Economic Association pre s i d e n t i a l
address in 1993, he said: 
There is no reason inherent in the real resources available to us
why we cannot move rapidly within the next two or three years
to a state of genuinely full employment and then continue
indefinitely at that level. We should then enjoy a major reduc-
tion in the ills of poverty, homelessness, sickness and crime that
this would entail. We might also see less resistance to re d u c-
tions of military expenditure, to liberalization of trade and
migration policy, and to conservation and environmental pro-
tection programs.
Should pro g ress toward genuinely full employment be tod a y ’s task for
economists? I think so. I hope so. As Beveridge said, “To win full
employment and keep it, we must will the end and understand and will
the means.”
a23Note s
1. These criticisms notwithstanding, many commentators have urged that the
EITC be expanded to boost employment and the income of poorly paid
workers (Bluestone and Ghilarducci 1996).
2. Wage subsidies have been proposed in Britain by Pigou (1933), Kaldor
(1936), Jackman and Layard (1986), and Snower (1993); in the United
States by Hammermesh (1978) and Haveman and Palmer (1982); and many
others.
3.  Workers might be willing to accept lower wages for some private sector jobs
if the work is more pleasant than in public service employment jobs or if the
jobs offer hope of advancement. But, for most private sector jobs, one would
expect that workers would not accept them unless they paid more than pub-
lic service employment jobs.
4.  Based on Wr a y ’s (1997) estimate of a program wage at $6.00 per hour for
2,080 hours per year.
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